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In New Zealand, child sexual assault is highly prevalent and it is not uncommon that there is 
a delay in reporting the alleged offence. Currently, judges are required to provide judicial 
instructions regarding memory if the alleged crime occurred more than a decade ago. Historic 
child sexual assault cases are challenging because there is often a lack of corroborating 
evidence as well as physical evidence. Jurors’ decisions, therefore, must rest primarily on 
memory-based evidence. This can raise many memory-related issues, which the average juror 
has a limited understanding of. Given that New Zealand has no statute of limitations, and 
therefore, the aim of the current study was to examine the impact of a memory-focused 
judicial instruction on juror decision-making in cases of historic child sexual abuse. Mock 
jurors read a case of historic child sexual assault and either received a memory-focused 
instruction or no instruction at all. I examined whether there were differences in mock jurors’ 
verdicts, ratings of guilt, and ratings of the believability of the witness as a function of 
judicial instruction condition. I found that a judicial instruction did influence mock jurors’ 
verdicts. Fewer participants who received the judicial instruction found the defendant guilty 
than did participants who received no instruction at all. Participants were also confident in 
their verdict decisions. I also found that while a judicial instruction did not significantly 
affect mock jurors’ believability ratings, verdict significantly affected believability ratings. 
These findings provide some insight into the impact that memory-focused instructions may 
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The Effect of Memory-Focused Judicial Instructions on Juror Decision-Making 
In New Zealand (NZ) criminal courts, a judge oversees the trial process whereby 
evidence is presented by the prosecution and the defence. There are two types of trials: judge-
alone trials and jury trials. In a judge-alone trial, it is up to the judge to decide the verdict. In 
jury trials, on the other hand, the judge advises the jury about the facts of the case, but it is 
the jury’s responsibility to reach a verdict (Bornstein & Greene, 2011). As such, juries play 
an important role in the legal system. Despite the importance of their role, jurors are ordinary 
citizens who often lack the knowledge necessary to make sense of complex and conflicting 
evidence. Evidence presented in court often contains legal jargon and sometimes includes 
complex scientific evidence including information about DNA, fingerprints, and ballistics.  
Many cases, particularly those that involve sexual assault, rest primarily on the complainant’s 
memory of the event in question and can sometimes raise highly technical issues involving 
memory. These memory issues include forgetting, memory distortion, and childhood 
amnesia. Like other kinds of scientific knowledge, the average juror has limited 
understanding of many of these memory-related issues (Wise, Sartori, Magnussen, & Safer, 
2014).  In New Zealand, current convention requires a judge to provide directions regarding 
memory if the alleged crime occurred more than a decade ago, but to date, there is very little 
evidence that jurors use the directions as part of their decision-making process. In the present 
research, I investigated the impact of memory-focused judicial directions on the way in which 
mock jurors make their verdict decisions. 
Child Sexual Assault 
In New Zealand, child sexual assault (CSA) is highly prevalent. In a World Health 
Organisation study, it was found that 28% of women (n = 2,855) had experienced CSA, 
which was higher than the other 10 countries included in the study (Fanslow, Robinson, 
Crengle, & Perese, 2007). A birth cohort study of over 1,000 New Zealand children found 
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that by age 25, 16% or 1 in 6 people reported experiencing some form of sexual assault 
before the age of 18 (Fergusson, Boden, & Horwood, 2008). In New Zealand, there is no 
statute of limitations for criminal offences, meaning there is no maximum time after an event 
within which it must be reported. In cases involving CSA, it is not uncommon that there is a 
delay between the time of the alleged offence and when a complaint is made (Flatman & 
Bagaric, 1998). This delay can range from years to decades later. When the delay between the 
alleged event and the allegations is very long, these cases are often referred to as cases of 
historical child sexual abuse (HCSA). It has been estimated that two-thirds of CSA victims 
delay reporting their abuse and half of those victims do not report it until they are adults 
(London, Bruck, Ceci, & Shuman, 2005). There are several reasons for a delay in reporting of 
CSA, including the age of the victim, reluctance to speak, self-blame, and family dynamics 
(Flatman & Bagaric, 1998).  
Due to the time lapse in reporting CSA, several memory-related issues become even 
more prominent, for example, the effects of memory decay, loss of physical evidence, lack of 
corroborating evidence, and unavailable witnesses (Flatman & Bagaric, 1998). In court, 
delays in reporting CSA may be a disadvantage to both the complainant and the defendant. 
For example, the memory of the complainant for specific details may have decayed such that 
it adversely impacts the believability of their testimony. In turn, a significant delay in making 
an allegation will also negatively impact the memory of the defendant such that they have 
difficulty in establishing their alibi, impeding their ability to defend themselves (Flatman & 
Bagaric, 1998). 
Delayed reporting can also influence the jury’s verdict. Some researchers have found 
that guilty verdicts are more likely in cases involving immediate reporting compared to when 
there was delay in reporting. For example, Pozzulo, Dempsey, and Crescini (2010) 
investigated the factors that affected jurors’ decisions in HCSA cases. Mock jurors read a 
 3 
transcript involving a HCSA case that varied three factors, one of them being the delay 
between the time of the alleged act and the time of reporting (2 vs. 15 vs. 30 years, later). 
Pozzulo et al. found that mock jurors assigned higher guilt ratings to the defendant when 
there was a 2-year delay in reporting compared to a 30-year delay. They also found that 
lengthier sentence recommendations were associated with the shorter delay condition. These 
findings suggest that mock jurors were less accepting of a complainant’s memory of the event 
(i.e. their testimony) when the delay was longer. 
Golding, Sego, Sanchez, and Hasemann (1995) also examined the length of delay in 
reporting CSA and jurors’ verdicts. In their study, mock jurors read a CSA case that was 
presented in one of three conditions: a) immediate reporting of alleged assault, b) reporting of 
alleged assault after remembering it for the first time 20 years later (i.e., repressed memory), 
and c) reporting of alleged assault after 20 years of continuous memory. Mock jurors in both 
of the delayed-reporting conditions rendered fewer guilty verdicts than did mock jurors in the 
immediate-reporting condition. 
CSA cases are challenging because the outcome often rests on evaluations of 
credibility which are further complicated by the lack of corroborating evidence (Lewis, 
2006). In Golding et al.’s (1995) study, mock jurors were not only asked to render a verdict in 
the CSA case but also to rate the believability of the complainant; complainants were rated as 
being less believable when they reported the assault after a delay. Other researchers have also 
found associations between credibility and sentence recommendation. Lewis, Klettke, and 
Day (2013), for example, examined the extent to which a number of variables (e.g., 
credibility of the victim, number of offences) influenced sentencing in CSA cases. Data for 
this study were obtained from trial transcripts of 66 CSA cases from the County Court of 
Victoria, Australia. The authors coded each transcript and rated the believability of each 
argument presented during the defence’s cross-examination of the victim. They found that 
 4 
lower levels of credibility of the complainant were associated with shorter sentencing 
recommendations for the defendant. 
 Emotions displayed by witnesses have also been found to influence credibility, which 
in turn have been shown to influence verdict decision. For example, Kaufmann, Drevland, 
Wessel, Overskeid, and Magnussen (2003), investigated the effects of emotions displayed by 
witnesses on ratings of their credibility. Participants viewed one of six videotaped versions of 
testimony from a sexual assault victim. The testimony represented a strong or weak rape 
scenario with one of three different emotions displayed by the victim: congruent, neutral, or 
incongruent. In the congruent condition, the victim displayed emotions expected of a rape 
victim (e.g., sobs, despair). In the neutral condition, the victim testified with little display of 
emotion. In the incongruent condition, the victim displayed emotions not expected of a rape 
victim (e.g., smiling). Overall, credibility ratings were reduced when the victim displayed 
neutral or incongruent emotions compared to when victims displayed congruent emotions. 
Participants who were exposed to congruent emotions were also more likely to judge the 
probability of the defendant being guilty higher than did participants who were exposed to 
neutral or incongruent emotions. These results suggest that the emotions displayed during 
testimony can be a strong determinant of the credibility of a sexual assault victim as well as 
the probability of guilt. 
Taken together, research highlights the importance of timely disclosure of CSA and 
also suggests that credibility is an important factor in the outcome of CSA abuse cases. 
Inevitably, in HCSA cases, jurors’ decisions must rest primarily on the witness’s memory for 






Providing additional instructions is one of many tools that the Court can use to help 
jurors make their verdict decisions. In many trials, the judge will provide instructions about 
important matters at hand (Coyle & Thomson, 2014). For example, judges regularly provide 
instructions about the degree to which particular aspects of evidence are admissible (e.g., 
hearsay evidence) or reliable (e.g., a witness’s demeanor as an indicator of truth-telling). In 
general, judicial instructions can be considered in two broad categories based on their 
purpose: 1) charging instructions, and 2) warnings. Charging instructions explain the role of 
the jury, describe laws relevant to the crime, and point out potential problems with evidence 
(e.g., eyewitness evidence). Warnings are instructions given to jurors to inform them to limit 
their use of evidence (Tanford, 1990). In most legal jurisdictions, judicial instructions are 
presented after the evidence (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979). This practice is likely based on 
the assumption among legal professionals that presenting instructions after the evidence 
(rather than before) will help jurors to remember and recall the instructions better when it 
comes to deliberation (Elwork, Sales, & Alfini, 1977).  
One purpose of judicial instructions provided by the judge is to serve as a guide for 
understanding legal concepts (McKimmie, Antrobus, & Baguley, 2014). Although these 
kinds of judicial instructions are designed to help jurors, they often contain complicated 
language and include facts that are not necessary for jurors to consider, raising concern over 
whether jurors understand the judicial instructions presented to them (Trimboli, 2008). 
Empirical research designed to assess the usefulness of judicial instructions to enhance 
jurors’ understanding has yielded equivocal findings (Eastwood & Caldwell, 2015). 
Laboratory-based research with mock juries and post-trial interviews with real jurors has 
revealed that jurors often have difficulty understanding judicial instructions (Bornstein & 
Greene, 2011; Bornstein & Hamm; 2012; Reifman, Gusick, & Ellsworth, 1992). For 
 6 
example, Reifman et al. surveyed 224 Michigan citizens who were called for jury duty in the 
United States about their understanding of judicial instructions about the law. In the survey, 
Reifman et al. assessed jurors’ memory of the instructions and compared the performance of 
those who had served as jurors (and so had received instructions) to the performance of those 
who had been called for jury duty but had not been selected as a juror. The survey also 
contained questions to assess whether jurors who received instructions about substantive law 
(law that defines the rights and duties of the parties; Gerdy, 2000), understood that law better 
than they understood procedural law (law that governs proceedings of the courts; Gerdy, 
2000; Reifman et al., 1992). Finally, participants were asked about the type of trial they 
served (if any), how the judge delivered the instructions, their previous experience with jury 
duty or with the law, and about the law around various crimes. Reifman et al. found that 
participants who had served on a jury understood less than 50% of the judicial instructions 
that they received at trial. In addition, although jurors who received judicial instructions 
performed better than those who had been called but not served (hence had not received 
instructions) when asked about procedural law, they performed no better when asked about 
substantive law.  
Common charging instructions include definitions of important legal terms such as 
“beyond reasonable doubt” and “burden of proof,” but researchers have revealed that jurors 
still have limited understanding of these terms (McKimmie et al., 2014). McKimmie et al. 
surveyed 33 jurors who had recently served on a jury and assessed their subjective 
(perception of understanding) and objective (actual understanding) comprehension of jury 
instructions about reasonable doubt and burden of proof. Jurors were asked to indicate to 
what extent they understood the jury instructions and to explain “beyond reasonable doubt” 
and “burden of proof” in their own words. Most jurors indicated that they understood both 
reasonable doubt and burden of proof, but when asked to explain each concept, only 13 out of 
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33 jurors could accurately explain beyond reasonable doubt, and only 20 out of the 33 jurors 
could accurately explain burden of proof. That is, although jurors reported high levels of 
understanding of the judicial instructions, their actual understanding was relatively low.  
In contrast to their lack of impact on jurors’ understanding of legal concepts, judicial 
instructions have been found to be beneficial in reducing common misconceptions about CSA 
and enhancing complainant believability in CSA cases. In one study, for example, researchers 
investigated the impact of judicial instructions on common misconceptions about CSA 
(Goodman-Delahunty, Cossins, & O’Brien, 2010). Participants read one of five versions of 
specialised CSA knowledge presented via either judicial instructions prior to reading 
evidence, judicial instructions following reading evidence, a clinical psychologist, or a 
general educative expert. In the fifth version, participants were not provided with specialised 
CSA knowledge at all. Participants then completed a series of questionnaires about 
complainant believability and then they rendered verdicts to the allegation. The researchers 
found that misconceptions about CSA were reduced by exposure to specialised information 
about CSA presented via judicial instructions or from an expert witness. Additionally, they 
found that judicial instructions increased the believability of the complainant, which in turn 
predicted guilty verdicts.  
Researchers have also examined the impact of different types of judicial instructions 
on mock jurors’ verdicts. In one of the earliest studies looking at judicial instructions and 
mock jurors’ verdicts, Hans and Brooks (1977) examined the effects of instructions about 
corroboration on a jury’s judgment of guilt in a rape case. Corroboration instructions are 
intended to warn jurors of the danger of convicting a defendant in the absence of 
corroboration on testimony of a child, or a victim of sexual assault. In Hans and Brooks’ 
study, participants were assigned to small juries of four members. Participants listened to one 
of four tape-recorded trials. All participants heard the same trial and the first part of the 
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judge’s instructions which defined rape. Then, participants were assigned to one of four 
instruction conditions. Some participants heard no further instructions; some received a 
warning about the victim’s reliability and a list of the potentially corroborative evidence in 
the case; some received only a warning about the victim’s reliability; and finally, the 
remaining participants received only a list of the potentially corroborative evidence. Juries 
were instructed to deliberate and to then render a unanimous guilty or not guilty verdict. 
Juries who heard some form of corroboration instruction tended to find the defendant guilty 
less often than did juries who did not hear any corroboration instructions. 
In another early research study on judicial instructions, Katzev and Wishart (1985) 
examined the influence of instructions about eyewitness identification on verdicts rendered 
by mock jurors. The aim of these instructions was to focus jurors’ attention on issues 
surrounding eyewitness identification and testimony. Participants watched a videotaped 
simulation of a trial involving a burglary and then listened to one of three versions of the 
judge’s instructions. The first version contained standard instructions regarding juror 
responsibility. The second version contained a summary of the evidence presented during the 
trial in addition to the standard instructions. The third version contained eyewitness 
instructions in addition to the standard instructions and summary of the evidence. The 
eyewitness instructions emphasised the fallibility of eyewitness identification and highlighted 
some of the issues commonly involved in eyewitness identification (e.g., lighting conditions). 
Following the instructions, participants individually rendered a verdict before deliberating in 
groups to reach a unanimous guilty or not guilty verdict. Jurors who heard the eyewitness 
identification instructions rendered significantly fewer guilty verdicts than did jurors who 
heard only the standard instructions and jurors who heard standard instructions and a 
summary of the evidence. In addition, jurors who heard the eyewitness instructions 
deliberated for less time than did jurors who did not hear the eyewitness instructions.  
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Researchers have also examined differences in verdicts between mock jurors who 
received judicial instructions and those who received no judicial instructions at all. For 
example, Cruse and Browne (1987) examined the effect of the timing of judicial instructions 
about grand larceny (theft of another person’s property) on mock jurors’ verdicts. Mock 
jurors were randomly assigned to receive pre-evidence instructions, post-evidence 
instructions, pre- and post-evidence instructions, or no instructions at all. After reading the 
instructions and evidence, mock jurors then rendered a verdict and provided a reason for their 
verdict. Cruse and Browne found that the timing of instructions made a difference in verdicts 
rendered by mock jurors. Mock jurors who received judicial instructions about grand larceny 
rendered fewer guilty verdicts than did those who did not receive instructions. 
In another study, Nikonova and Ogloff (2005) examined the impact of judicial 
instructions about child witnesses and witness age on mock jurors’ verdicts. The researchers 
employed a set of jury instructions that can be used in Canadian Criminal courts when a child 
is a witness. The aim of the instruction is to alert the jury to the potential danger of convicting 
a defendant based on uncorroborated evidence from a child witness. In Nikonova and 
Ogloff’s study, all participants listened to an audiotaped theft trial where the age of the 
witness was either 7 or 10 years. Participants then received instructions or not. After listening 
to the trial, participants individually rendered a verdict and rated the credibility of the witness 
and the defendant. When the witness was 7-years old, the presence of judicial instructions 
had no impact on guilty verdicts. When the witness was 10-years old, on the other hand, there 
were fewer guilty verdicts when the judicial instructions were present than when they were 
absent.  
In another study on the impact of judicial instructions on juror decision-making, 
Zdrok and Bersoff (2003) investigated the effects of judicial instructions to disregard the 
defendant’s decision to remain silent. In their study, jurors watched one of three versions of a 
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two-hour-long truncated version of a trial involving robbery and conspiracy. The trial 
versions differed in the strength of the instruction to disregard the defendant’s decision to 
remain silent. In Version 1, no instruction was given; in Version 2, a simple instruction was 
given; and in Version 3, a strong instruction to disregard the defendant’s silence was given. 
After participants watched the trial, they first rendered individual verdicts. Next, they were 
randomly assigned to small groups of 2-6 jurors and instructed to deliberate and render a 
verdict as a group. Consistent with the researchers’ predictions, instructing the jurors to 
disregard the defendant’s decision to remain silent resulted in greater rates of guilty verdicts. 
This was true for both versions of the judicial instructions, and for verdicts rendered pre- and 
post-deliberation. 
Researchers have also found an influence of judicial instructions about reasonable 
doubt on jurors’ verdicts. In one study conducted online, for example, Cichinni and White 
(2017) had mock jurors each read a hypothetical case involving child sexual assault. They 
were then randomly assigned to one of three groups, each of which received a different type 
of instruction. Group 1 received instructions which told them to “search for the truth,” Group 
2 received legal judicial instructions on reasonable doubt, and Group 3 received a 
combination of instructions on reasonable doubt and to “search for the truth.” After reading 
the judicial instructions, jurors were asked to render a verdict. Mock jurors in Groups 1 and 3 
rendered an almost identical number of guilty verdicts (Group 1: 30%; Group 3: 29%), 
however, only 16% of mock jurors in Group 2 rendered a guilty verdict. Participants were 
also asked to rate how certain they were that they had made a correct decision. The mean for 
all three groups was 7 (fairly certain) on a 10-point rating scale. Mock jurors who received 
instructions to “search for the truth” convicted at a significantly higher rate than did jurors 
who received only the legal jury instructions on reasonable doubt.  
 11 
In contrast to the research described above, other researchers have found that 
providing judicial instructions has no effect on jurors’ verdicts. For example, Kassin and 
Wrightsman (1981) investigated whether judicial instructions on voluntariness (a choice 
made on the basis of a person’s free will, as opposed to being made as a result of coercion) 
could influence jurors’ evaluations of evidence involving a coerced confession. In their first 
experiment, participants read a transcript involving a case of auto theft in which the 
defendant had either confessed on his own, after an offer of leniency, or after a threat of 
punishment. Participants then received either a short form of a voluntariness instruction 
which directed them to ignore a coerced confession, a longer form which further defined 
voluntariness, or no instructions at all. Once participants finished reading the transcripts and 
instructions (if any), they made a voluntariness judgment, rendered a verdict, and rated their 
confidence in that verdict. Participants disregarded the confession after a threat of 
punishment, but not the confession after an offer of leniency. Participants who read the 
confession after an offer of leniency rendered a higher percentage of guilty verdicts compared 
to participants who read the voluntary confession or the confession after a threat of 
punishment. Neither version of the judicial instructions significantly altered these guilty 
verdicts. 
In Kassin and Wrightsman’s (1981) second experiment, participants read an assault 
case involving a voluntary or a positively-coerced confession and were provided with one of 
four different types of judicial instructions. Participants received judicial instructions about 
credibility, which stressed the unreliability of coerced confessions; sympathy, which stressed 
the unfairness of coerced confessions; a combination of credibility and sympathy; or received 
no instructions at all. Once participants finished reading the transcripts and instructions (if 
any), they made a voluntariness judgment, rendered a verdict, and rated their confidence in 
that verdict. Although neither version of the judicial instructions significantly affected 
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verdicts, the combined instruction significantly reduced the frequency of voluntariness 
judgments. 
Researchers have also found that the timing of judicial instructions (prior to or after 
evidence) may have no effect on the verdicts rendered by mock jurors. For example, Greene 
and Loftus (1985) examined the influence of instructions about multiple offences on mock 
jurors’ verdicts. The trial consisted of hypothetical transcripts which described a murder 
charge and a rape charge. Judicial instructions about multiple offenses were taken from the 
Washington State Pattern Instructions, a database of jury instructions. The main measure was 
the rating of guilt on a 7-point scale. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
groups. Group one read the judicial instructions before the transcripts, group two read the 
judicial instructions after the transcripts, and group three were given no instructions at all. 
The mean guilt ratings for all three groups were between 4.31 and 4.63. That is, Greene and 
Loftus found no difference in the effect of pre-evidence and post-evidence instructions on 
ratings of guilt. 
Another type of judicial instructions that have been examined in relation to jurors’ 
verdicts are limiting instructions. Limiting instructions are provided by a judge to instruct 
jurors to disregard inadmissible evidence. For example, Paglia and Schuller (1998) examined 
the effect of limiting instructions on juror’s verdicts. Paglia and Schuller recruited mock 
jurors who were exposed to one of six versions of a homicide trial that included hearsay 
evidence. Jurors listened to limiting instructions either immediately after the evidence, at the 
end of the trial, or at both of these times. Following the trial, mock jurors rendered a verdict 
and rated the strength of each case. Paglia and Schuller found that presenting instructions 
immediately after the evidence, at the end of the trial, or at both of these times had no effect 
on jurors’ verdicts.  
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Although we have no way of knowing whether the verdicts rendered in these studies 
are the correct decision or not, the evidence suggests that overall, the evidence is relatively 
equal for an impact or for no impact of judicial instructions on jurors’ verdicts. The variations 
in these research findings may indicate that the ultimate effect of instructions may depend on 
the case and other legal materials. So far, I have discussed many types of judicial instructions 
and their impact on juror decision-making. It is beneficial to consider other contexts where 
providing jurors with additional information may be useful. In many cases, particularly cases 
involving HCSA, jurors must evaluate memory-based evidence. Many people, however, have 
misconceptions about how memory works and are unaware of the myriad of issues associated 
with memory. These misconceptions will be discussed in the next section. Accordingly, it is 
important to examine how memory-focused judicial instructions influence juror decision-
making in cases of HCSA. 
Memory-Focused Judicial Instructions 
Despite what many people believe, our memories are not necessarily an exact and 
accurate representation of our past experiences. Instead, memories are pieces of past 
experiences put together in a plausible manner (Howe, 2013; Lynn, Evans, Laurence, & 
Lilienfeld, 2015). Both laypeople and professionals hold a number of misconceptions about 
memory. In one study documenting common misconceptions about memory, Simons and 
Chabris (2011) conducted a telephone survey with 1500 respondents in the United States 
assessing their beliefs about memory. The survey consisted of 16 questions based on common 
misconceptions about memory. Alarmingly, 63% of respondents agreed that memory works 
like a video camera, providing an exact and accurate representation of past experiences – this 
view is inconsistent with what the scientific literature tells us about memory. Additionally, 
83% of respondents agreed that people with amnesia typically cannot recall their own name 
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and 47.6% of the respondents agreed that once you have experienced an event and formed a 
memory of it, that memory does not change.   
Other researchers have also found a lack of knowledge on memory issues among 
important stakeholders in court. For example, Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, and 
Bradshaw (2006) examined knowledge of eyewitness memory issues among jurors, judges, 
and law enforcement workers. Participants were asked to agree or disagree with 30 
statements about issues regarding eyewitness memory. Participants’ responses were 
compared to results from memory experts who completed the same questionnaire. Among 
this sample, jurors had the greatest lack of knowledge on these eyewitness memory issues, 
disagreeing with experts on 87% of the statements. Judges and law enforcement workers 
disagreed with experts on 60% of the statements. These findings suggest a significant lack of 
knowledge about memory issues among jurors, judges, and law enforcement workers. 
These misconceptions about memory have also been found among other professional 
groups. For example, Magnussen and Melinder (2011) surveyed psychologists about their 
beliefs on how memory works. The survey consisted of 12 topics regarding eyewitness 
testimony and general memory issues. The correct response alternative for each statement 
was determined based on reviews of the relevant scientific literature. They found that, in 
general, clinical psychologists did not perform better than lay people on tests of knowledge of 
issues of eyewitness memory Overall, psychologists were only correct 63% of the time. In 
fact, the average level of knowledge about these particular memory issues for the 
psychologist sample was similar to the knowledge of the judges and lay people. Taken 
together, these results reflect the common misconceptions that people hold about the way that 
memory works (Simons & Chabris, 2011; Magnussen & Melinder, 2011). These 
misconceptions can have consequences in court cases where jurors have to evaluate evidence 
which is primarily memory-based (e.g., HCSA cases). Providing jurors with additional 
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information through memory-focused judicial instructions is one way to help them evaluate 
memory-based evidence. Memory-focused instructions are intended to correct common 
beliefs and misconceptions about memory. In 2012, the New Jersey Supreme Court proposed 
new judicial instructions called Henderson instructions that were designed to assist jurors to 
evaluate eyewitness evidence by providing them with comprehensive information on human 
memory and the factors that can influence eyewitness memory and identification (New Jersey 
Supreme Court, 2012b). Although the findings regarding the effectiveness of memory-
focused juridical instructions have been mixed, such instructions may leave jurors more 
critical of the evidence.  
For example, Jones, Bergold, Dillon, and Penrod (2017) examined whether 
Henderson instructions sensitised jurors to unreliable eyewitness testimony. Sensitivity in 
this context refers to an improvement in jurors’ ability to evaluate the quality of an 
eyewitness identification, such that there is a decrease in guilty verdicts when the 
identification was weak and increase in guilty verdicts when the identification was strong 
(Cutler, Dexter, & Penrod, 1989). Participants were randomly assigned to view one of 20 
videotaped versions of a trial involving attempted rape. The versions varied in the quality of 
witnessing conditions, which manipulated exposure duration, weapon presence, and time 
delay; quality of identification conditions, which manipulated identification procedure type; 
lineup instructions; and confirmatory feedback, and type of instructions presented. 
Participants were presented with either no instructions; Henderson instructions; enhanced 
Henderson instructions; expert testimony; or a combination of Henderson instructions and 
expert testimony. The Henderson instructions explained the stages and processes of memory 
as well as the factors that can influence eyewitness memory. The enhanced Henderson 
instructions also included the judge discussing research findings in relation to estimator and 
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system factors that can influence eyewitness identification (e.g., lineup instructions, duration 
of exposure, presence of a weapon). 
 After viewing their assigned trial and listening to the instructions (if any), each 
participant rated the witnesses on multiple factors including believability, honesty, and 
trustworthiness. Participants also were asked to indicate the probability that the eyewitness 
correctly identified the defendant as the perpetrator and finally to render a guilty or not guilty 
verdict. Jones et al. (2017) found that expert testimony resulted in scepticism by reducing the 
likelihood that jurors found the defendant guilty, regardless of identification and witnessing 
conditions. However, neither version of the judicial instructions influenced verdicts. 
Although jurors were sensitive to the quality of identification conditions, there was no effect 
for the quality of witnessing conditions, even with the addition of both versions of the 
memory-focused Henderson instructions.  
Papailiou, Yokum, and Robertson (2015) also investigated the effectiveness of 
instructions about eyewitness testimony on jurors’ evaluations of eyewitness evidence. Mock 
jurors watched one of four simulations of a 35-minute trial involving a case of murder where 
the identification quality was weak or strong. After watching the trial, jurors were presented 
with one of two types of judicial instructions: standard or enhanced eyewitness testimony 
instructions. The standard instructions contained a short paragraph of information that the 
juror should consider. The enhanced instructions were longer and based on research on the 
issues of human memory and variables that can effect memory. Mock jurors then rendered a 
guilty or not guilty verdict and responded to a series of questions about their confidence in 
their verdict decision, comprehension of judicial instructions, use of evidence, and reliability 
of eyewitness testimony. Mock jurors who received the enhanced instructions rendered fewer 
guilty verdicts than did mock jurors who received the standard instructions. 
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In another study on the impact of memory-focused judicial instructions on juror 
decision-making, Kurinec and Weaver (2018) investigated eyewitness language choice and 
memory-focused judicial instructions. In their first study, participants were randomly 
assigned to read a transcript of a case involving robbery with the eyewitness using either 
concrete (e.g., he hit him) or abstract (e.g., he’s aggressive) language. After participants read 
the transcript, they rendered their verdict and answered questions regarding eyewitness 
credibility. Jurors who read testimony with more concrete language were more likely to 
render a guilty verdict and more likely to find the eyewitness credible. In Kurinec and 
Weaver’s second study, participants read the same case used in Study 1, and were assigned to 
read testimony involving either concrete or abstract language. After reading the testimony, 
participants either read judicial instructions or a document of unrelated content as a filler 
activity. The judicial instructions described the stages of memory and the factors that can 
affect eyewitness memory. Jurors then rendered verdicts and rated eyewitness credibility. 
Consistent with Study 1, jurors who read the testimony with more concrete language were 
more likely to render a guilty verdict. This effect was mitigated when jurors received 
memory-focused judicial instructions. That is, jurors who received memory-focused 
instructions were less likely to render a guilty verdict than were jurors who did not receive 
memory-focused instructions. 
Although the findings on the effects of memory-focused instructions has been mixed, 
the instructions have been mainly examined in relation to eyewitness identification. There has 
been very little research on memory-focused instructions in cases of HCSA where the 
primary evidence is the complainant’s memory for the event(s). 
The Present Study 
Given the prevalence of HCSA in New Zealand and the lack of knowledge about 
memory among important stakeholders in court, the findings described so far have important 
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implications especially for cases where the main evidence consists of an adult recalling 
historic events they allegedly experienced as a child. Cases involving sexual assault are likely 
to proceed by way of a jury trial of 12 members, as opposed to a judge-alone trial (New 
Zealand Law Commission, 2012). Cases of HCSA often lack corroborating evidence as well 
as physical evidence. As such, jurors’ evaluations of the case must rest primarily on the 
memory-based evidence, yet laypeople and jurors have a limited understanding of these 
memory-related issues. Any time that evidence and instructions are misunderstood, this 
increases the likelihood of miscarriages of justice and the likelihood of wrongful convictions 
increases. To date, a total of 365 wrongly-convicted people have been exonerated through the 
Innocence Project in the United States. The Innocence Project is an organisation that is 
committed to exonerating wrongly convicted people through DNA testing (The Innocence 
Project, 2017). Researchers’ estimates of wrongful conviction rates over all types of cases 
vary from 0.5% to 5% (e.g., Poveda, 2001; Zalman, 2013). These estimates are based on 
court procedural errors and number of exonerations. In New Zealand alone, for the year 2017, 
a total of 64,433 adults were convicted and sentenced (Statistics New Zealand, 2018). 
Assuming a conservative wrongful conviction rate of 0.5%, that is an estimated 322 
miscarriages of justice per year in New Zealand. It is possible that providing jurors with 
additional judicial instructions might aid their decision-making processes when evaluating 
evidence and reaching a verdict. 
Much of the existing jury research has focused on the influence of different types of 
judicial instructions on juror decision-making. However, as far as I am aware, there are no 
studies on the effects of judicial instructions in HCSA cases. An important question for the 
Court to consider is whether judicial instructions regarding memory influence jurors’ 
decision-making in cases involving HCSA. In the present research, I assessed the impact of 
judicial instructions regarding memory, which are currently required in New Zealand courts 
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if the alleged crime took place more than 10 years ago (Evidence Act 2006, s. 122(2)(e)). To 
examine the impact of judicial instructions in cases involving HCSA, I compared the pattern 
of verdicts that mock jurors rendered in a trial involving HCSA when those instructions were 
provided or not. I also assessed the impact of judicial instructions on mock jurors’ ratings of a 























A total of 60 jury-eligible participants aged between 18 and 63 years were recruited to 
take part in this study (41 females, 18 males, and 1 participant identified as gender diverse; M 
age = 38.73 years; SD = 11.87)1. Participants identified as New Zealand European (85%), 
Māori (5%), Indian (3.3%), Samoan (1.7%), Cook Island Maori (1.7%), Chinese (1.7%), or 
Asian (1.7%). Participants were recruited from the Psychology Research Participation Pool, 
through Facebook, or via word of mouth including posters displayed at local supermarkets in 
Dunedin, New Zealand. Participants were reimbursed NZD$40 for their costs of 
participating. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants. Recruitment 
information clearly stated that the experiment involved exposure to explicit details of an 
alleged sexual assault, and therefore could cause distress to some people. Potential 
participants were asked not to take part in the experiment if they felt that such materials 
would cause them distress. The research was reviewed and approved by the University of 
Otago Human Ethics Committee (see Appendix A), which is accredited by the New Zealand 
Health Research Council and whose guidelines are consistent with those of the American 
Psychological Association.  
Materials 
Mock jurors were asked to evaluate evidence based on sworn testimony that was 
provided in the New Zealand District Court. Working with Judge Michael Crosbie, a New 
Zealand District Court judge in Dunedin for 16 years, we identified a case in which there was 
little corroborating evidence for the allegations against the accused and, as such, jurors’ 
decisions rested on the complainant’s memory for the event in question. I used trial testimony 
 
1 Only one (female) participant was aged under 24 years. 
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based on a complainant’s direct evidence and cross-examination2. During the trial, four 
witnesses provided direct testimony and were cross-examined; a female complainant, a male 
defendant, a female prosecution witness, and a female defence witness. The complainant 
alleged that when she was aged 6, the defendant (the complainant’s uncle) inserted his fingers 
into her vagina while she was on his shoulders at a local swimming pool. The complainant 
was aged 32 at the time of the trial.  
I used the memory instruction currently suggested by the New Zealand Court that was 
given by Judge McDonald in DH v R [2015]: 
In view of the significance of these matters in the trial, it may be helpful if I give you 
some guidance about memories, given the witnesses are referring back to events that 
happened 25 years ago.  Human memories are not stored as if recorded on a tape, 
unaltered, to be played back at some later time as an exact recording of an event, I 
am sure you are all perfectly aware of that from your own experiences.  Nor are 
memories always completely accurate.  Memory depends in part on knowledge and in 
part on other sources of information additional to what is recorded when the event is 
first experienced.  So the accuracy and fullness of any person’s recall may be 
dependent on factors such as the time that has passed since the event, and the 
personal significance of the event.  That is a matter of common sense.  We all have 
clear recollections of things that are personally significant to us.  The emotive content 
of the event, the occurrence of other related events, why and by whom the person is 
being asked to recall, and the kinds of retrieving cues provided at the time of recall all 
affect the ability to recall an event. 
 
2 To anonymise the transcript, we changed the names of all of the witnesses as well as the location where the 
offence was alleged to have taken place. 
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So you need to think about those sorts of things when making a decision about 
particular evidence which depends for its reliability on the fullness of the witness’s 
recollection of what was said and done. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups in the laboratory. There were three to six 
participants in each mock jury group. Participants were quasi-randomly assigned to one of 
two judicial instruction conditions, such that were even numbers of participants in each of the 
conditions. Half of the participants were assigned to the No condition (n = 30) in which 
participants did not receive judicial instructions. Half were assigned to the Yes condition (n = 
30) in which participants received judicial instructions. After obtaining consent, participants 
provided demographic information such as their age, gender, ethnicity, and highest level of 
qualification (see Appendix B for a copy of the demographic questions). 
Participants were then asked to put themselves in the role of a juror as they read a 
transcript of a trial involving a case of HCSA. The transcript was identical for all participants 
with the one exception that for participants in the Yes condition, the end of the transcript 
contained the New Zealand Court’s memory instruction. The transcript that participants in the 
No condition received did not contain the memory instruction. 
When all participants finished reading the transcript, they were asked to complete a 
paper questionnaire (see Appendix C). First, participants were asked to rate the defendant’s 
guilt on a continuous scale from 0% (Not at all guilty) to 100% (definitely guilty). All 
participants were asked about the following allegation: At his trial, Arthur Young was 
charged with the following offence: that between 1 July 1989 and 1 July 1991 at Timaru, he 
sexually violated Charlotte Brown by having unlawful sexual connection with her. Please 
indicate your rating of Arthur Young’s guilt from 0% being not at all guilty to 100% guilty. 
Participants were provided with a 10-cm line with 0% (Not at all Guilty) anchoring one end 
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and 100% (Definitely Guilty) anchoring the other end and were asked to indicate their guilt 
rating by marking a line on the scale. After rating the defendant’s guilt, participants were 
asked to use a seven-point scale (1 = Not at all believable; 4 = Neutral; 7 = Extremely 
believable) to rate the believability of each of the witnesses (e.g., “Charlotte Brown was the 
complainant. How believable was her testimony?”). 
Once participants completed the questionnaire, the experimenter began the verbal 
interview (see Appendix D for a copy of the interview questions). First, participants were 
asked what verdict they had rendered to the charge and to explain their reasoning for their 
verdict.  Participants were then asked to talk about what additional evidence or testimony 
they thought that they would have needed to reach a different verdict. Next, participants were 
asked to consider whether there was any other information that the judge or an expert witness 
could have provided during the trial that would have been helpful to them when considering 
their verdict. Finally, participants who received the judicial instructions were asked whether 
the information about the effects of delay on memory was useful and participants who did not 
receive the judicial instructions were asked whether information about effects of delay on 
memory would have been useful. 
After completing the verbal interview, participants were thanked for their time and 
debriefed.  
Coding 
To score participants’ guilt rating, I used a ruler to measure the point at which each 
participant indicated their guilt rating. For example, if the participant marked a point on the 
line that was 6.5 cm from the start of the line, I coded this as 65% on the scale. 
The verbal interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. I then coded the 
participants’ statements for their reasoning in rendering a guilty or not guilty verdict to the 
charges using a coding scheme developed in our laboratory. Jurors’ reasons for their verdicts 
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were coded into one of five categories: 1. Memory-related Issues 2. Attributes of the 
complainant (e.g., statements about believability, confidence, consistency, demeanour), 3. 
Attributes of the defendant, and 4. Legal process issues. To establish the reliability of the 
coding, two coders independently scored 50% of the interviews. There was 78% agreement 




Table 1 summarises the descriptive statistics for the demographic variables of 
participants’ age, gender, and education as a function of judicial instruction group. Chi-
square tests and independent samples t-tests indicated that there were no significant 




Age, gender, and education distribution of the groups (standard deviations or percentages in 
parentheses). 
Measure Judicial Instructions 
(n = 30) 
No Judicial Instructions 
(n = 30) 
Age (years) 40.66 (11.09) 37.57 (12.16) 
Gender F = 19, M = 10, GD = 1 F = 22, M = 8 
Education    
NCEA Level 1-3 10 (33.4%) 7 (23.3%) 
Bachelors/Hons/PGDip 
Degree/Level 7 
14 (46%) 14 (46%) 
Postgraduate 1 (3%) 7 (24%) 
Other 5 (17%) - 
Note. F = female, M = male, GD = gender diverse. 
 
Statistical Analysis 
All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS Version 25 for Windows and 
statistical significance was set at p < .05. The data for participants’ dichotomous verdict was 
analysed using a Chi-square test. The remaining dependent variables were subjected to 
separate 2 (Judicial Instruction Condition) × 2 (Verdict: Guilty, Not Guilty) analyses of 
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variance (ANOVA). Any significant effects were examined using the Bonferroni correction 
for pairwise-comparisons.  
Verdict Rendered 
At the beginning of the verbal interview, participants were asked to indicate whether 
they rendered a Guilty or Not Guilty verdict to the allegation that Arthur Young sexually 
violated Charlotte Brown. As shown in Figure 1, when participants did not receive judicial 
instructions, they were equally likely to render a guilty or not guilty verdict. In contrast, when 
they received judicial instructions, this pattern changed. Mock jurors who received the 
memory-focused judicial instruction (Yes condition) were significantly less likely to render a 
Guilty verdict than were mock jurors who did not receive the judicial instruction (No 
condition), 2(1, N = 60) = 4.44, p = .03, w = .27. 
 
Figure 1. The number of participants who found the defendant guilty or not guilty of the 
allegation as a function of judicial instruction condition (No, Yes). 
Guilt Rating 
 Next, participants’ guilt ratings were examined using the continuous scale from 0% 
(Not at all Guilty) to 100% (Definitely Guilty). Figure 2 shows that regardless of judicial 
instruction condition, participants who rendered a guilty verdict assigned higher guilt ratings 



























verdict (M = 30.62, SE = 3.98), F(1, 56) = 46.99, p < .01, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .46. There were no other 
effects (largest F = 0.05, p = .82). 
I also conducted a series of one-sample t-tests to compare participants’ guilt ratings 
against a hypothetical no difference in guilt rating of 50%. Regardless of judicial instruction 
condition, participants who rendered a guilty verdict rated the defendant’s guilt significantly 
greater than 50% and participants who rendered a not guilty verdict rated the defendant’s 
guilt significantly less than 50% (all p’s < .01). 
 
Figure 2. Participants’ mean guilt ratings as a function of judicial instruction condition (No, 
Yes) and verdict (guilty, not guilty). Error bars reflect standard errors of the means.  
 
Believability Ratings 
Recall that participants were asked to rate the believability of each of the witnesses 
using a scale from 1 (Not at all Believable) to 7 (Extremely Believable). 
 Complainant. As shown in Figure 3, participants who found the defendant guilty of 
the allegation gave higher believability ratings to the complainant (M = 5.67, SE = 0.25) than 
did participants who found the defendant not guilty (M = 3.35, SE = 0.20), F(1, 56) = 54.44, p 
< .01, 𝜼𝒑



















































Figure 3. Participants’ mean believability ratings of the complainant’s testimony as a 
function of judicial instruction condition (No, Yes) and verdict (guilty, not guilty). Error bars 
reflect standard errors of the means. 
 
Defendant. As shown in Figure 4, participants who found the defendant guilty of the 
allegation gave significantly lower believability ratings to the defendant (M = 3.66, SE = 
0.28) than did participants who found the defendant not guilty (M = 5.05, SE = 0.22), F(1, 56) 
= 14.93, p < .01, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .21. There were no other effects (largest F = 2.05, p = .04). 
 
Figure 4. Participants’ mean believability ratings of the defendant’s testimony as a function 
of judicial instruction condition (No, Yes) and verdict (guilty, not guilty). Error bars reflect 


































































































Prosecution witness. As shown in Figure 5, participants who found the defendant 
guilty of the allegation gave higher believability ratings to the prosecution witness (M = 4.88, 
SE = 0.29) than did participants who found the defendant not guilty (M = 4.03, SE = 0.23), 
F(1, 56) = 5.32, p = .03, p < .01, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .09. There were no other effects (largest F = 0.69, p = 
.09). 
 
Figure 5. Participants’ mean believability ratings of the prosecution witness’ testimony as a 
function of judicial instruction condition (No, Yes) and verdict (guilty, not guilty). Error bars 
reflect standard errors of the means. 
 
Defence witness. As shown in Figure 6, participants who found the defendant guilty 
of the allegation gave lower believability ratings to the defence witness (M = 3.25, SE = 0.31) 
than did participants who found the defendant not guilty (M = 4.96, SE = 0.24), F(1, 56) = 
19.15, p < .01, 𝜼𝒑




















































Figure 6. Participants’ mean believability ratings of the defence witness’ testimony as a 
function of judicial instruction condition (No, Yes) and verdict (guilty, not guilty). Error bars 
reflect standard errors of the means. 
 
Verbal Interview 
In the next part of the analysis, I examined participants’ responses to the questions 
that I asked during the verbal interview. First, I examined participants’ reasons for the verdict 
that they rendered to the allegation. Table 2 shows the frequency of each reason provided. 
Participants could provide more than one reason for the verdict that they rendered to the 
allegation; therefore, the frequency of reasons is higher than the number of participants. 
Overall, the most common reasons that participants provided were related to the personal 



















































Participants’ reasons for the verdict that they rendered to the allegation. 
 Yes - Guilty  
(n = 8) 
Yes - Not Guilty 
(n = 22) 
No – Guilty 
(n = 16) 
No - Not Guilty 
(n = 14) 
1. Memory-Related     
Complainant’s memory for the events was unclear/inconsistent  12 (54%)  3 (15%) 
Natural for memories for a historic event to be unclear/incomplete 2 (25%) 
 6 (37%)  
Traumatic events can influence memory   3 (14%)   
Total 2 15 6 3 
2. Attributes of the complainant   
   
The complainant’s story was believable   2 (25%)  4 (25%)  
Total 2  4 
 
3. Attributes of the defendant   
   
Not physically possible for the defendant to carry out alleged act  9 (40%)  12 (60%) 
Defendant’s testimony seemed premeditated 4 (50%)  11 (69%)  
The defendant’s story was believable  2 (9%)  2 (10%) 
Total 4 11 11 14 
4. Legal process issues  
   
Lack of corroborating evidence  9 (40%)  2 (10%) 
Total  9  2 
Note. Yes = received judicial instruction, No = did not receive judicial instruction, , G = Guilty verdict rendered, NG = Not Guilty verdict rendered 
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Next, I examined participants’ responses to the question about what additional 
evidence or testimony they thought that they would have needed to reach a different verdict. 
The most common additional evidence that participants indicated that they would have 
needed to reach a different verdict was memory-related. Sixteen mock jurors said they would 
have needed evidence from the lifeguards who worked at the pool at the time of the alleged 
event and 12 mock jurors would have needed evidence from the complainant’s sister. 
Participants also talked about needing evidence from independent witnesses outside of the 
family, from the defendant’s work colleagues, and from character witnesses. 
I then examined participants’ responses about what other information the judge or an 
expert witness could have provided during the trial that would have been helpful to them 
when considering their verdict. The majority of participants indicated that they did not know 
what kind of other information a judge could provide. A few participants mentioned that they 
would have liked research on how memory works, information about the mental health 
history of the complainant, and more information about how the pool operated; however, this 
is not information that a judge can usually provide. Not surprisingly, the most common 
responses about information that an expert witness could have provided were again related to 
memory. More specifically, 12 mock jurors indicated that they would have liked more 
information on how memory works and 11 mock jurors would have liked information on how 
trauma influences memory. Other responses included research on how children’s memories 
work and child sexual assault.  
Finally, I examined whether participants who received the judicial instructions found 
them useful and whether participants who did not receive the judicial instructions thought 
information about the effects of delay on memory would have been useful. Of the 18 
participants in the judicial instruction condition who answered this question, 14 participants 
reported finding the information about the effects of delay on memory useful and 4 
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participants did not find them useful. Of the 20 participants in the no judicial instruction 
condition who answered, all 20 thought that information about the effects of delay on 




The main goal of the present study was to investigate the impact of judicial 
instructions on juror decision-making. Given that New Zealand has no statute of limitations, I 
was particularly interested in how judicial instructions regarding memory influence juror 
decision-making in cases of historic child sexual abuse. To do this, I investigated whether 
there were differences in verdicts between two conditions where mock jurors did or did not 
receive memory-focused judicial instructions. I also examined the content of discussion 
during a verbal interview to determine whether there were any differences in the factors that 
mock jurors considered to reach their verdict, and to determine any differences between the 
two judicial instruction conditions.   
 I found that fewer participants who received memory-focused judicial instructions 
found the defendant guilty than did participants who received no instructions at all. I also 
found that participants who rendered a guilty verdict were confident in their decision (i.e., 
participants’ guilt ratings were significantly greater than 50%). Participants who rendered a 
not guilty verdict were also confident in their decision (i.e., participants’ guilt ratings were 
significantly less than 50%). In both conditions, participants who found the defendant guilty 
of the allegation rated the complainant and the prosecution witness as more believable and 
participants who found the defendant not guilty rated the defendant and defence witness as 
more believable.  
In the present study, judicial instructions did influence jurors’ verdicts. This finding is 
similar to previous research on memory-focused judicial instructions in cases involving other 
kinds of crimes. For example, Papailiou et al. (2015) found that mock jurors who received 
instructions based on research on the issues of human memory rendered fewer guilty verdicts 
than did mock jurors who received the standard instructions. Even though the instructions 
used in the present study were much shorter and less comprehensive than the enhanced 
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instructions used by Papailiou et al., it appears that the instructions played a role in mock 
jurors’ decision-making processes. It is possible that a summing up of memory-focused 
instructions is just as effective as longer, more detailed instructions.  
 In the present study, verdict significantly affected how believable participants found 
each of the four witnesses. Given that the outcomes of CSA cases rest heavily on the 
believability of the witnesses, it is reasonable to expect that one would find the complainant 
more believable if they found the defendant guilty (Lewis, 2006). Not surprisingly, 
participants who found the defendant guilty of the allegation rated the complainant and the 
prosecution witness as more believable. Participants who found the defendant not guilty rated 
the defendant and defence witness as more believable. These findings are consistent with 
several previous studies in which researchers have found that the less credible the 
complainant appears, the more likely it is that mock jurors will render a guilty verdict (e.g., 
Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2010; Kaufman et al., 2003). Although judicial instructions have 
been found to be beneficial in enhancing complainant believability in CSA cases, this was not 
the case in the present study. Judicial instructions did not affect whether participants found 
the complainant more or less believable. This finding stands in contrast to previous research 
findings. Goodman-Delahunty et al. (2010) for example, found that participants who received 
judicial instructions found the complainant more believable than did participants who 
received no judicial instructions. One potential explanation for the difference in findings 
between the current study and Goodman-Delahunty et al. relates to the characteristics of the 
complainant in the two studies. In the present study, for example, many participants stated 
that they thought the complainant and the prosecution witness had a lower level of intellect 
and social standing, compared to the defendant and defence witness. For example, one 
participant stated, “I was thinking the husband and wife were really well schooled up. They 
had worked out exactly how it was going to work; with their level of intellect and their social 
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standing. I think there’s a whole bunch of factors that helped prepare them for giving 
evidence.” Another participant stated, “I think we do bring in all these stereotypes and 
judgements we have of different social class and SES, and if she came from an affluent family 
and her mother was more well-spoken, we would probably presume she was telling the 
truth.” Previous studies have illustrated that assessments of believability can be affected by 
intelligence and socioeconomic status. For example, Lees (2018) found that mock jurors 
perceived a victim of CSA with a high SES as more credible than a victim of CSA with a low 
SES. Furthermore, jurors who perceived the CSA victim as more credible were significantly 
more likely to render a guilty verdict. 
Examination of the content of the group interviews provides some insight into the 
factors that may play a role in jurors’ decision-making. The most common reasons that 
participants provided for reaching a not guilty verdict, across both judicial instruction 
conditions, were related to the attributes of the defendant. More specifically, many 
participants stated that they could not see how it was physically possible for the defendant to 
carry out the alleged act. One participant, for example, stated, while relating to their personal 
experiences “from a practical point of view I just don’t know how you would actually 
physically do what the complainant alleged. I’ve got a son and I carry him on my shoulders 
at the pool and have to balance him with two hands.” Another participant stated, “I just 
didn’t see how it was physically possible, like easily for it to have occurred without anybody 
noticing.”  
Another reason that commonly came up for reaching a not guilty verdict were 
memory-related. Moreover, participants who received judicial instructions brought up these 
memory-related issues as a reason for reaching their verdict more often than did participants 
who did not receive judicial instructions. Thus, the judicial instructions about memory 
appeared to influence mock jurors’ decision-making process. Many participants mentioned 
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that they thought the complainant’s memory for the events was unclear and inconsistent and 
therefore less credible. For example, one participant stated, “it seems like something easily 
could have happened but she’s just completely misremembering it and so all the details she 
gives makes her sounds like she’s not credible.”  Previous studies have illustrated that 
credibility can impact outcomes of CSA trials. For example, Lewis et al. (2013) found that 
lower levels of credibility of the complainant were associated with shorter sentencing 
recommendations for the defendant. 
Across both conditions, the majority of the participants who rendered a guilty verdict 
thought the defendant’s testimony seemed premeditated and that the defendant and his wife’s 
testimonies were too similar. One participant stated, “I thought it was quite pointed when 
they talked to Arthur’s wife and she could remember stuff in such good detail, and they were 
like are you sure you didn’t discuss it with your husband to make this sound exactly 
identical.” Another participant stated, “what they said it just didn’t add up to me, why would 
you remember 26 years later, one visit to the swimming pool with a couple of kids, it just 
seemed odd that they would have a vivid memory.” Here, it appears that mock jurors judged 
the witnesses’ memories as “too good” to be accurate.  
Across both conditions, participants said that additional evidence, such as evidence 
from the complainants’ sister and from the lifeguards who worked at the pool at the time of 
the alleged event would have influenced their verdicts; however, participants did 
acknowledge that this type of information would be difficult to obtain. Again, this type of 
information also relies on witnesses’ memory for a historic event. Moreover, a handful of 
participants who found the defendant not guilty said that they believed something may have 
happened, but not in the way that the complainant had recalled it. These participants further 
mentioned that they would have liked further evidence and more witnesses in general, stating 
that there was not enough evidence to conclude that the defendant was guilty. Thus, 
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corroborating evidence was a concern for these jurors, in accordance with other research 
findings (e.g., Tabak & Klettke, 2014). Participants often questioned if they would have 
access to more evidence if they were in a real-life trial. One participant, for example, 
remarked that, “based on the evidence I’ve read, I found him not guilty. There just isn’t 
enough evidence. If I were on the actual trial for this, I probably would have more 
information, I guess this transcript is only a part of it. I may have changed my verdict.” 
Access to more information may not always be possible. In cases of historic child sexual 
assault, for instance, there is often already a lack of evidence and no physical evidence 
(Walsh, Jones, Cross & Lippert, 2010). These conditions have implications for real-life 
jurors, their decision-making process, and ultimately their verdicts. 
Many participants did not know what kind of information a judge could provide. A 
few participants mentioned that they would have liked information about how memory 
works. Some even acknowledged that they knew that the judge cannot provide this 
information and suggested an expert witness could be more useful. A majority of the 
participants understood what an expert witness was but for those who did not know, the 
experimenter provided them with a brief explanation. Not surprisingly, when participants 
were asked about what information an expert witness could have provided that would have 
been useful, the most common responses were related to memory. This was true regardless of 
whether they had received judicial instructions about memory or not. One participant, for 
example, said, “I think maybe a psychologist to explain how memory works  because I found 
myself getting frustrated when the complainant was being interrogated…there seemed to be 
no understanding of how memory worked and that she may not necessarily be able to recall 
the details of what she is being asked to remember. I thought it would be helpful to have that 
explanation but that would probably more than anything, make me believe her story even 
more.” A number of participants also mentioned that information from an expert on how 
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trauma influences memory would have been useful. One participant stated, “It’s pretty tough, 
like all you could really do is have a psychologist come in and explain how trauma affects 
memories.” In New Zealand, expert witnesses may be permitted to testify in court if their 
expert knowledge will assist the decision-makers in understanding the evidence in a case. 
There are four main rules of evidence for an expert witness. First, an expert witness must 
address the evidence within the expert’s area of expertise. Second, they must state the facts 
on which the opinions are based and the reasons. Third, they must specify literature in 
support of the opinions, and finally, an expert witness must describe any tests that they have 
relied on to form their opinion (High Court Rules, 2016). 
More recently, psychological experts have begun used to testify in child sexual assault 
cases. Because there is usually little to no corroborating and physical evidence in CSA cases, 
an expert’s testimony can support the testimony as well as help the decision-makers 
understand the evidence (Gabora, Spanos, & Joab, 1993; Zajac, Garry, London, Goodyear-
Smith, & Hayne, 2013). Research findings have suggested that expert testimony can impact 
jurors decision-making process. Klettke, Graesser, and Powell (2009) for instance, examined 
the impact of expert testimony on jurors’ decision-making processes in cases of CSA. Mock 
jurors read cases of CSA followed by expert testimony. Strength of evidence presented by the 
expert was manipulated by how much the evidence supported the case that the child was 
abused. In the condition of high strength of evidence, the expert referred to medical 
symptoms and matched these symptoms to CSA. In the condition of low strength of evidence, 
no physical evidence was presented and clinical symptoms were given an alternative 
explanation. After participants read the case, they then rated complainant credibility, guilt of 
the defendant, and the effectiveness of the expert testimony. Klettke et al. (2009) found that 
experts were effective and had an impact on juror decision-making when the testimony 
involved evidence high in strength or when the testimony was highly consistent. 
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Interestingly, the qualifications of the expert witness (clinical psychologist vs. counsellor) 
had no significant impact on jurors’ decisions. Furthermore, both the credibility ratings of the 
defendant and the guilt ratings of the defendant were lower when both evidence strength and 
consistency were low. Taken together, the findings from the present research and that of 
previous studies suggest that an expert witness can influence jurors’ decision-making 
processes. In future, it would be interesting to investigate whether information on memory-
related issues would be more effective presented by an expert witness compared to by a 
judge. 
 In the present research, participants who received the memory-focused judicial 
instructions did so after reading the evidence. One participant mentioned that if they had been 
able to read the instructions before reading the evidence it may have been more helpful in 
considering their verdict. Past research findings on the timing of presenting judicial 
instructions (i.e., before or after the evidence) in cases involving other kinds of crimes have 
been mixed. Some researchers have suggested that presenting instructions prior to evidence 
may influence jurors more than presenting instructions after the evidence (e.g., Ingriselli, 
2015; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979). Other researchers have found that the timing of 
instructions had no effect on jurors’ verdicts (e.g., Cruse & Browne, 1987; Greene & Loftus, 
1985). Currently, there has been no research on the effects of the timing of memory-focused 
instructions. Accordingly, future research on memory-focused instructions could investigate 
the timing of presenting the instructions. 
A criticism of past research on juror decision-making has been that the majority of 
mock jury research findings are based on university students, and given the relative 
infrequency with which university students serve on actual juries, that the findings from these 
studies may be less generalisable to the population (Bornstein, 1999; Bray & Kerr, 1982). In 
the present study, I recruited a diverse sample of participants from the wider community, 
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therefore I am confident that my results are generalisable to the wider population. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the extent to which we could mimic the conditions 
that would naturally occur in an actual courtroom trial is limited, as with any jury simulation 
research. One key difference in the present study compared with actual jury trials and many 
mock jury simulations is the presentation of evidence. Participants in the present study read a 
written transcript of the trial as opposed to viewing videotaped testimony or listening to 
audiotaped testimony. Compared videotaped or audiotaped testimony, there is no display of 
emotion and body language in written testimony. Some participants mentioned that their 
judgments and verdicts may have been different if they were able to see a videotaped or 
audiotaped trial, as opposed to reading a written transcript. One participant expressed that 
seeing witnesses’ body language and emotional responses is a factor that would play a role in 
their decision-making process: “I think witnessing their testimonies in person would be a big 
factor for me as well because I’m a firm believer in body language and presentation of 
someone’s character when delivering a statement, people have tells and that kind of thing.” 
Research findings have illustrated that emotions play a role in determining credibility, which 
can impact outcomes of CSA trials. For example, Kaufmann et al. (2003) found that 
credibility ratings were reduced when the victim displayed emotions which were neutral or 
incongruent to emotions expected of a sexual assault victim. Accordingly, it would be 
important for future researchers to investigate memory-focused instructions in CSA trials 
presented via videotape. 
Although the present findings allow us to draw some important conclusions about the 
effect of judicial instructions on juror decision-making in HCSA cases, the study has its 
limitations. First, the sample size in the present study was relatively small, with a total of 60 
participants and thus the external validity of the findings of the present study may have been 
reduced. A second limitation of the present study was that mock jurors were required to make 
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decisions and render a verdict individually. In real jury trials, decisions are made as part of a 
group. Research has shown that people make decisions differently as individuals compared to 
when they are in a group (Bornstein & Greene, 2011). Although in the present study, jurors 
were able to discuss their reasoning for their decision with the group, their individual verdicts 
were rendered prior to the group interview – and it was these verdicts that I considered in the 
analyses. In future research, it would be interesting to investigate individual verdicts as well 
as group verdicts, post-group interview. Furthermore, it was difficult to obtain an explicit 
answer from a handful of participants when I asked them whether they found the memory-
focused instructions useful. While a majority of the participants who received the memory-
focused instructions reported that they did find them useful, there were a handful of 
participants who did not answer. It is possible that this was due to the nature of the group 
setting. In future this question may be more effective when asked individually on a paper 
questionnaire. 
Conclusion 
This study was motivated by issues surrounding memory and the limited research in 
the area of memory-focused judicial instructions. Overall, the findings of the present study 
suggest that memory-focused judicial instructions can influence juror decision-making in 
HCSA cases. The present study has implications for future mock jury research and the New 
Zealand legal system. In New Zealand, cases of HCSA are relatively common, raising 
memory-related issues not only for the witnesses but also the juror. Providing memory-
focused judicial instructions is one way the Court can help jurors make their decisions. The 
research on the influence of memory-focused instructions on juror decision-making is 
currently limited, particularly in cases related to HCSA. The findings of the present study 
provides a new insight into how the New Zealand legal system could consider using memory-
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focused instructions to establish more rigorous courtroom procedures when it comes to cases 
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1. Your Age in years: _______ 
 
Please circle your answer for each of the following questions:  
2. Your Gender:  
a. Female 
b. Male 
c. Gender Diverse 
3. Your Ethnicity (Race):  
a. New Zealand European 
b. Māori 
c. Samoan 





i. Other, please state your ethnicity: ____________________________________ 
 
4. Your Highest Level of Qualification:  
a. NCEA Level 1 
b. NCEA Level 2 
c. NCEA Level 3 
d. Bachelor’s Degree or Level 7 qualification 
e. Bachelor Honours Degree or Postgraduate Diploma 
f. Master’s degree 
g. PhD 










At his trial, Arthur Young was charged with the following offence: 
• That between 1 July 1989 and 1 July 1991 at Timaru, he sexually violated 
Charlotte Brown by having unlawful sexual connection with her. 
 
Please use a line on the scale below to indicate your rating of Arthur Young’s guilt: 
  
       Not at all Guilty Definitely Guilty 
 
Now we will ask you about the believability of the testimony provided by each of the 
witnesses. Please circle a number to indicate your rating of each witness’ believability: 
 
1. Charlotte Brown was the complainant. How BELIEVABLE was her testimony? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





2. Arthur Young was the defendant. How BELIEVABLE was his testimony? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





3. April Farmer (Charlotte Brown’s mother) was the prosecution witness. How 
BELIEVABLE was her testimony? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





4. Cathy Young (Arthur Young’s wife) was the defence witness. How 
BELIEVABLE was her testimony? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




100% 0%         





Verbal Interview3  
 
Thanks for completing the questionnaire. Now I want to talk about the factors that you 
considered to reach your verdict. 
 
1. Who found Arthur Young Guilty? Who found him Not Guilty? 
 
2. For those of you who found him Guilty, why did you reach that verdict? For those of 
you who found him Not Guilty, why did you reach that verdict? 
 
3. What additional evidence or testimony do you think that you would have needed to 
reach a different verdict? 
 
4. Is there any information that the judge could have provided during the trial that would 
have been helpful to you when considering your verdict? [Is there any other 
information that the judge could have provided during the trial that would have been 
helpful to you when considering your verdict?] 
 
5. Is there any information that an expert witness could have provided during the trial 
that would have been helpful to you when considering your verdict? 
 
6. Do you think that information about the effects of delay on memory would be useful? 





3 The questions in italics are the versions that participants in the Memory Instruction group were asked. 
